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In this paper, we explore the role of the legal system in economic development, 
focusing on its relationship to the role of private mechanisms in contract enforcement. 
We use long-term prefecture-level panel data that cover the early stages of 
industrialization and urbanization in Japan. We found that industrialization increased 
the demand for civil lawsuits, but that this was conditional on urbanization. In other 
words, increased demand for civil suits occurred only where industrialization and 
urbanization simultaneously progressed. At the same time, the inefficiency of the legal 
system impeded industrial growth, but only conditional on urbanization. That is, the 
inefficiency of the legal system impeded industrialization only in urban areas. These 
findings suggest that community-based contract enforcement mechanisms worked in 
rural areas and that these mechanisms were replaced by the formal legal system as 
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Since the seminal work of North and Thomas (North and Thomas 1973), most 
economists and economic historians have agreed that the protection of property rights is 
the key to the development of a market economy. Specifically, North and Thomas (1973) 
focused on the protection of property rights by the state. Many empirical studies in law 
and finance confirm that the quality of the legal system, especially the protection of 
creditors’ rights, is positively associated with financial development (Djankov et al. 
2007; Jappelli et al. 2005; LaPorta et al. 1997, 1998; Levine 1998, 1999; Haselsman et al. 
2009). 
On the other hand, in recent years, theoretical studies have established that 
contracts can also be enforced by private mechanisms based on collective punishment, 
and that a market economy can work even if society lacks a reliable state court or if a 
standardized judicial system is not suited to the relevant transactions (Aoki 2001; Dixit 
2004; Greif 2006; Milgrom et al. 1990; Kandori 1992). Moreover, this view has empirical 
support from historical studies (Clay 1997; Ellickson 1991; Greif 2006; Okazaki 2005), 
as well as from research on developing and transition economies (Allen et al. 2005; 
Fafchamps 2004; Greif and Kandel 1995; McMillan and Woodruff 1999a, 1999b). 
Given the diversity of contract enforcement systems, Greif (1997) argued that the 
relative efficiency of those systems depends upon economic and social conditions. These 
conditions include the extent of exchanges and the reservation utility of the relevant 
agents. A private contract enforcement system based on collective punishment can be 
more efficient than the legal system if the market is not too large. This is because the 
former has a lower initial fixed cost. In addition, a collective system can enforce 
contracts that are observable but not verifiable by the legal system. On the other hand, 
for a collective system to be effective, exchanges must be limited to a certain group 
whose members repeatedly trade with each other. Hence, if potential gains from 
intergroup exchanges are large enough and if the market is large enough to compensate 
the initial fixed cost, the legal system can be more efficient than collective systems. 
Further, collective punishment is not effective if agents’ reservation utility is high; for 
instance, this may arise if market expansion and/or integration facilitates finding a new 
match outside the current trading group. In other words, private governance is 
intrinsically restricted to take place within personal trades and cannot embrace an 
impersonal market economy (North 2005). 
Based on the above literature, in this paper we intend to explore empirically the 
relative importance of the legal system in fostering economic development. Specifically, 
we focus on such questions as how the legal system contributed to industrialization and 
how that function depended upon economic and social conditions. For this purpose, we 
use prefecture-level data from Japan from 1885–1925, which was a period of rapid 
industrialization, urbanization and market integration. The basic data source is the 
Annual Report on Civil Case Statistics (Minji Tokei Nenpo) published by the Ministry of 
Justice, which includes detailed court-level judicial data. Using this source, we 
constructed prefecture-level panel data on judicial variables and combined them with 
other relevant economic and social variables. The extent of industrialization and 
urbanization substantially varied across prefectures during that period. By exploiting 
this variation, we intend to examine econometrically the above questions. To our 
knowledge, this is the first systematic empirical attempt to address the above questions 
using long-term panel data that cover the early stages of industrialization and 
urbanization. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the 
history of the legal system in Japan. In Section 3, we describe the basic features of civil 
lawsuits. In Section 4, we explore quantitatively the relationship between the legal 
system and economic development. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2. A brief history of the legal system in Japan 
2.1. The manorial system in medieval times 
The legal system in Japan dates back to the early eighth century. The imperial 
government formed around the Emperor completed the introduction of the Chinese 
administrative system during that period. Under the regime of the Imperial Legal Codes 
(Ritsuryo), the manorial system emerged. According to the Imperial Legal Codes, 
property rights to, and rule over, every piece of land formally belonged to the Emperor. 
In practice, however, because the central government did not have sufficient resources to 
directly rule distant local societies, the manorial system was formed as a decentralized 
governance organization. At the same time, the manorial system played a role in 
promoting agricultural growth by providing incentives for reclamation. 
Suppose a local leader developed a new paddy field. Initially, his property rights to 
the paddy field were not secure. Thus, he “donated” the paddy field to a local noble. Then 
the local noble “donated” the paddy field to a noble in the capital Kyoto. Then, the 
metropolitan noble “donated” the paddy field to the imperial family, Fujiwara, the 
premier family, or to a major temple embraced by the Emperor. Then, the imperial 
family, Fujiwara, or the temple, requested the Emperor to authorize the paddy field as a 
“manor.” The authorization of a manor implied delegation of rule over, and claim to, the 
paddy field. From the local leader to the highest noble, each agent was delegated a 
specific obligation of rule and was guaranteed claim to a specific portion of rent in 
association with his obligation. If the local leader was a warrior, samurai, he was usually 
delegated the duty of keeping peace and order in the local society on behalf of the 
Emperor, and was guaranteed claim over a small portion of the rent from the paddy field. 
The highest nobles and temples were usually obliged to supply judicial services on 
behalf of the Emperor. The bundle of obligations and claims of each agent was called 
“shiki,” which means job. The manorial system expanded from the 11th century to the 
14th century (Nagahara 1973, pp. 28-53). 
 
2.2. Transition to the early modern times 
The manorial system was gradually dismantled from the mid-14th century. As 
technological progress in agriculture increased the importance of farmers’ investment 
and effort, greater claims accrued to farmers. On the other hand, since the 
establishment in the late 12th century of the Kamakura Shogunate (the samurais’ own 
headquarters-cum-government), the role of farmers in governance increased, while the 
roles of nobles and the Emperor correspondingly declined. After a long period of civil 
warfare, Japan was reunited under the Edo (later Tokyo) Shogunate, established in 
1603 (Nishitani 2006, pp. 443-476; Araki 1986, pp. 17-63). 
After the demise of the manorial system, property, and sovereignty were drastically 
simplified. While the Shogunate, as the central government, held sovereignty over 
diplomacy and national security against foreign countries, in domestic affairs, the 
Shogunate and feudal lords (daimyo) ruled their own domains and maintained 
independence. On any paddy field, only one government, the Shogunate or a feudal lord, 
held the exclusive power to levy tax. In addition, on any paddy field, only one farmer was 
registered by the Shogunate or by a feudal lord as its owner. The farmer was obliged to 
pay tax in kind to the Shogunate or to the feudal lord. In return, he was guaranteed an 
exclusive claim over the residual crop after the payment of tax, which was defined ex 
ante and amounted to an average of 40% of the crop value. 
 
2.3. The judicial system in early modern Japan 
Although feudal lords formally maintained independent sovereignty for domestic 
affairs, in practice, they followed the Shogunate. The largest cities directly ruled by the Shogunate, such as Edo, Kyoto, and Osaka, held the courts of the city governors, 
appointed by the Shogunate. Until the early 18th century, the Shogunate prohibited 
guilds and encouraged free trade. The provision of judicial services by the city courts 
supplanted this policy, and city courts dealt increasingly with lawsuits, as market trades 
expanded. 
Whereas the supply of judicial services for civil cases differentiates the early 
modern  Shogunate from both the medieval Shogunate and the medieval imperial 
government, it was still deficient given early modern Japan’s rapid urbanization: for 
example, Edo’s population had reached one million by the early 18th century. Thus, a 
considerable share of commercial trades was still governed by private guilds, termed 
nakama (meaning fellows). 
At the same time, effective judicial services accelerated market expansion and, 
thereby, the number of civil cases. In the early 18th century , when the Shogunate city 
court had finally reached the limit of its capabilities, the Shogunate made a decisive 
policy change. Breaking with the tradition of one-and-one-half centuries, the Shogunate 
chartered guilds dealing with important monopolistically produced commodities and 
had them govern trades. Chartered guilds were termed kabu nakama, which means 
chartered fellows (Miyamoto 1938; Okazaki 2005). 
Because the Shogunate considered  that having judicial services was not the rights 
of the people but a favor to them, the granting of judicial services could be suspended 
when it became burdensome for the government. Indeed, the Shogunate sometimes 
enacted orders to encourage private settlement instead of lawsuits for cases over 
unsecured claims in Edo from the early 18th century, with chartered guilds being 
expected to take more responsibility for trade governance. 
In rural areas, a different scheme was applied. Each farmer registered his property 
rights to the paddy field he cultivated at the office of the village in which he lived. The 
village office kept the property registration book, and made a tax payment contract 
based on the book with the Shogunate. Under this village contractor system under 
which the village took responsibility for tax payment, in practice the village office 
protected farmers’ properties and recorded any trades related to their land. The village 
office, unsurprisingly, governed land and finance sales secured by land. Thus, the village 
office was recognized as a trial court, and parties could appeal a ruling to the office of the 
magistrate in the region (Shirakawabe 2004, pp. 273-274). 
A serious problem with this regime was that the village office could govern trades 
only between residents of the same village whose property was registered at the office. 
Property rights were linked to land-tax payments, and land tax was collected by the 
village office based on the property registration book. Hence, both sellers and buyers of 
village land had to be village residents. This meant that any land and finance sales 
secured by land beyond the village border could not rely on the Shogunate judicial 
system and had to be self-governed. 
It followed that having more judicial services supplied in cities and having 
intervillage land and financial markets governed by the state court gave the market 
economy of Japan the potential to expand. Nationwide standardization of the judicial 
system would thus prompt economic development. Such drastic reform came with the 
westernization of the judicial system following the Meiji Restoration. 
 
2.4. The introduction of the Western legal system 
After a period of isolation of over 200 years, in 1854, under military pressure, the 
Shogunate established diplomatic relations with the US. Then, in 1859, it joined a free 
trade regime according to the treaties in 1858. This sudden immersion in the free trade 
environment greatly affected the Japanese economy’s relative prices, which were 
perceived as chaotic by the general populace (Shinbo 1978; Bernhofen and Brown 2004). Moreover, Japan had to approve consulate jurisdiction to the Western countries under 
the 1854 treaties, and had to give up tariff autonomy under the 1858 treaties. Although 
national security was supposed to be the duty of the samurai class, the Shogunate 
evidently failed to achieve it. 
In this situation, powerful feudal lords supporting the Emperor defeated the 
Shogunate in 1868, and immediately reestablished a new government around the 
Emperor. This initiated the radical political institutional reform known as the “Meiji 
Restoration.” An important goal of the New Imperial Government was to revise “partial 
treaties” with the Western countries. However, the Western powers used the lack of a 
modern legal system, and thus the lack of human rights, including property rights, as an 
excuse to refuse revision of the treaties. This attitude of the Western powers compelled 
the New Imperial Government to introduce a Western-style legal system. 
In 1872, the New Imperial Government officially allowed land to be bought and sold 
beyond village borders. This led to intervillage trades of land being governed by the state 
court. Furthermore, in 1873, the New Imperial Government implemented the “Land Tax 
Reform” by which any holder of land was registered directly by the central government, 
not through the village office, as the exclusive owner in the modern sense, who thus had 
to pay taxes in money to the central government. While the property rights of farmers 
were authorized by the New Imperial Government, any claims to the ex-territories of the 
feudal lords were not approved, except for the government bonds that capitalized their 
tax revenues. 
In 1873, the New Imperial Government invited Gustave Emile Boissonade de 
Fontarabie, a law professor at the University of Paris, to help formulate the Civil Codes, 
the Commercial Codes, and the Criminal Law. In 1880, the Criminal Law, the first 
Western-style law in Japanese legal history, was proclaimed, and it came into effect in 
1882. The Civil Codes and the Commercial Codes based on French law were proclaimed 
in 1890, and were then modified by the introduction of German elements before being 
enacted. The Amended Civil Codes, proclaimed in two halves in 1896 and 1898, were 
enacted in 1898. The Amended Civil Codes were proclaimed and enacted in 1899. 
Facing a determined civil rights movement led by ex-samurais and rich farmers 
following the Meiji Restoration, the New Imperial Government issued an ordinance that 
the state would “gradually move to a constitutional state.” In 1875, Hermann Rösler, a 
Prussian scholar, was invited to advise on formulating the Constitution. In 1889, the 
New Imperial Government proclaimed the Constitution of the Empire of Japan that in 
many respects, followed the Prussian constitution. Under the Imperial Constitution, 
which remained in effect from 1890 to 1947, the protection of property rights and 
freedom of contract were guaranteed as fundamental civil rights. The Constitution, 
along with the Civil Codes and Commercial Codes, constituted a fully detailed rule book 
for the market economy. 
 
2.5. The development of legal organizations and the formation of human capital 
While the modern legal system was fully established in the 1890s, ordinances and 
laws that could be regarded as fragments of a modern legal system had been introduced 
since the early 1870s. For instance, the 1872 National Bank Act, a copy of its American 
counterpart, provided a model for the joint-stock company and, indeed, the stock 
exchange played a significant role in Japan’s industrial revolution from the 1880s. The 
1890s was the period in which the institutions of the modern legal system were 
consolidated. 
The court system was no exception. The Court Organization Law, the Civil Lawsuit 
Process Law, and the Criminal Lawsuit Process Law were proclaimed and enacted in 
1890. However, the formation of the legal system began in the early 1870s. In 1872, the 
New Imperial Government established the Ministry of Justice, which represented the first attempt to make the judiciary relatively independent within the administration, 
and judicial officers were separated from the other bureaucrats. In 1875, when the 
government declared its intention to achieve a gradual transition to a constitutional 
state, the Supreme Court (Daishin In) was established as an organization fully 
independent of the administration. In 1886, the Court Organization Ordinance was 
proclaimed, marking the completion of the introduction of the basic structure of a 
Western court system. 
Once the Criminal Law, the Constitution, the Civil Codes, and the Commercial 
Codes had been proclaimed, legal studies on how to apply them in Japan flourished. The 
fundamental studies were published in the 1890s, and some remain relevant to this day. 
The Department of Law of the Imperial University of Tokyo was at the center of this 
study, and it supplied the government with a new generation of judges, prosecutors, and 
bureaucrats. In this period, many private law schools were established, which became a 
source of lawyers for the private sector. By the late 1890s, a consistent rule book on the 
market economy and the associated requisite human resources were in place to promote 
the market economy. 
 
3. Industrialization, urbanization, and the role of the courts: Descriptive analysis 
In this section, we survey the basic features of civil lawsuits in prewar Japan, using 
data from the Annual Report on Civil Case Statistics (Minji Tokei Nenpo) published by 
the Ministry of Justice. The Japanese court system comprised four tiers, namely, the 
Supreme Court, high courts, district courts, and ward courts. With respect to civil cases, 
the ward courts held the first trial for suits in which no more than 100 yen was at stake 
and for those involving compromises. As shown in Table 1, most of the first trials were 
accepted at word courts. 
In 1895, there were 301 ward courts under 49 district courts (Table 1). In 1913, 
because of cuts in government expenditures, 128 ward courts were abolished, but 46 of 
these courts were revived in 1917 and another 31 reopened in 1919 (Secretariat of the 
Supreme Court 1990, pp. 113–114). In addition, it is notable that the total number of 




Figure 1 illustrates the number of civil cases judged at ward courts from 1891, the 
year following the introduction of the Code of Civil Procedure.  The total number of suits 
shows a clear upward trend. It increased from 155,913 in 1891 to 285,707 in 1929. At the 
same time, the number of suits changed cyclically, which suggests that this number was 
associated with the business cycle. To illustrate the relationship between the cyclical 
changes in the number of suits and the business cycle, Figure 2 shows the annual 
percentage change in the number of newly accepted suits and that the diffusion index of 
Fujino and Igarashi (1973).1 It is apparent that the percentage change in the number of 
suits was negatively associated with the business cycle. For the period from 1892 to 1929, 
the correlation coefficient between the percentage change in newly accepted suits and 
the diffusion index is –0.40. 
 
Figure 1, 2 
 
                                                            
1 Fujino and Igarashi (1975) developed several diffusion indexes. The series in Panel B is 
“the diffusion index based on the normalized percentage change from the same month of 
the previous year” (pp. 128–129). In Panel B of Figure 2, the index in each December is 
plotted. Figure 1 shows that the growth rate of civil suits was positive in most years, but 
there were three distinct periods in which the growth rate for the number of suits was 
continuously negative, namely 1893–1896, 1904–1907, and 1916–1920. The first period 
includes the periods of the Sino–Japanese War and of the ensuing boom deriving from 
increased government expenditures based on reparations from China. The second period 
includes the period of the Russo–Japanese War and of the subsequent boom. Although 
Japan did not get reparations on this occasion, the effect of the war was to stimulate 
growth in the heavy and chemical industries. The period 1916–1920 is the boom period 
during the First World War. Because the production capacity of the Western countries 
was taken up by munitions, the Japanese economy enjoyed huge export-led prosperity. 
At the same time, the heavy and chemical industries expanded substantially     
substituting for Western imports. These three boom periods were followed by recessions. 
During the periods of recession, the growth rate of lawsuits increased and the level 
remained high.2 The countercyclical pattern of lawsuits arguably reflects the pattern of 
defaults in the business cycle. This conjecture is consistent with the composition of the 
suits outlined below. 
Figure 1 also illustrates the composition of civil suits by issue. The proportion of 
suits on monetary issues stayed at around 40% from the 1890s to the 1910s, and it 
increased to around 50% in the 1920s. The trend and cycle in the total number of civil 
suits were primarily the result of changes in the number of suits dealing with monetary 
issues. Monetary issues were further divided into subcategories. Although the 
classifications adopted in the Annual Report on Civil Case Statistics change over time, 
they are sufficiently stable for a general picture to emerge. Table 2 reports the 
subcategories for monetary issues for which the number of cases was at least 1,000 in 
1895, 1910, and 1925. For all years, the largest subcategory is the one for loans, followed 
by sales credit including “bills.”3 It is reasonable to assume that a large proportion of the 
suits on monetary issues were broadly related to credit, including loans and sales credit. 
In other words, credit was a major source of the disputes brought before the courts in 
prewar Japan. On the other hand, clearly, in general, the exchange in which QUID is 
separated from QUO is essential to the expansion of a market economy, and to bring this 
about, contracts must be enforced (North 1990, 2005; Greif 2006). Table 2 indicates that 





A useful feature of the Annual Report on Civil Case Statistics is that it contains 
lawsuit data by area. The areas were divided according to the jurisdictions of district 
courts and ward courts. The jurisdictional area of each district court corresponded to the 
prefecture in which the court was located, except for Hokkaido, and that of each ward 
court corresponded to a city or a county within a prefecture. Although cases heard by 
ward courts are the focus of this paper, we have aggregated the prefectural-level data so 
that the suit data are consistent with the relevant economic and social data. Table 3 
shows the number of lawsuits further aggregated to the district level to save space. To 
                                                            
2 What seems to be an exception is the early 1910s. In this period, the diffusion index 
indicates that business had entered a prosperous phase, but the growth rate in lawsuits 
remained at a high level. This may be because the prosperous phase was weak, as 
reflected in the relatively low level of the diffusion index (Panel B). Indeed, this 
prosperous phase was referred to as “interim prosperity” at the time. 
3 It is notable that the suits concerning sales credit became substantially larger from 
1895 to 1925. This may reflect the growing use of credit in transactions in this period. control for differences in population across provinces, the per capita number of suits is 
also reported. It is notable that there was substantial cross-sectional as well as 
time-series variation in the per capita number of civil suits. For example, in 1895, there 
were 2.82 times more lawsuits per capita in Hokkaido than in Chubu province. While 
lawsuits increased by 2.45 times in Chugoku province from 1895 to 1925, they declined 
by 0.89 times in Tohoku province during the same period. The cross-sectional and 




4. Industrialization, urbanization, and the role of the courts: Quantitative analysis 
As explained above, there was large cross-sectional and time-series variation in the 
per capita number of civil suits. First, we examined the determinants of the demand for 
legal services using this variation. Haley (1978) and Ginsburg and Hoetaker (2006) 
examined the determinants of the number of civil suits using data from the Annual 
Report on Civil Case Statistics and its postwar counterpart, the Annual Report of 
Judicial Case Statistics (Shiho Tokei Nenpo).4 Using prewar time-series data, Haley 
(1978) found that the number of lawsuits was positively correlated with the number of 
lawyers per capita, the speed of judgment in the previous year and the share of the 
population working in agriculture. 
Ginsburg and Hoetaker (2006) analyzed prefecture-level panel data from 1986 to 
2001. They found that the number of civil suits per capita was positively affected by the 
number of lawyers per capita, the number of judges per capita, the civil procedure 
reform in 1998, and per capita income. They also found that civil suits per capita were 
negatively affected by the annual change in per capita income. At the same time, they 
found no evidence that urban prefectures (Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto) are more litigious 
than are other prefectures. They interpreted this result as evidence against cultural and 
sociological theories of litigation. Because Ginsburg and Hoetaker (2006) corrected for 
the possible endogeneity of the numbers of lawyers and judges by using instruments, 
their estimation results can be interpreted as a demand function for civil suits. 
Following the basic approach of Ginsburg and Hoetaker (2006), we estimated a 
demand function for civil suits for the prewar period, but using different variables and 
methodology. The dependent variable is the number of civil suits per capita newly 
accepted by ward courts (SUIT), as used by Haley (1978) and by Ginsburg and Hoetaker 
(2006). We assume that the demand for civil suits depends on the frequency with which 
disputes occur in impersonal trades, the availability of alternative mechanisms of 
dispute resolution, and litigation costs. The frequency of disputes is represented by the 
degree of industrialization, measured as the share of factory workers in the total 
population (WORKER). The availability of alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution 
is represented by the degree of urbanization. In other words, we hypothesize that 
existing community based dispute resolution mechanisms became less effective in urban 
areas. The urban population (URBAN) is defined as the population of a city, town, or 
village of at least 50,000 people. We hypothesize that the effects of industrialization and 
urbanization complemented each other. To capture this complementarity, we add the 
interaction term, WORKER*URBAN. These are the key variables for addressing the 
issues raised in the introduction to this paper. For the litigation cost variable, we use 
delay of judgment, measured as the proportion of suits not judged within one month 
(OVER1M) or within three months (OVER3M). Thus, the equation to be estimated is as 
follows: 
                                                            
4 The Annual Report on Civil Case Statistics and the Annual Report on Criminal Case 
Statistics were merged into the Annual Report of Judicial Statistics.  
SUITit = 0 + 1WORKERit + 2URBANit + 3WORKERit*URBANit + 4OVER1(or 3)Mit 
 + YEARt + eit, (1) 
 
where i indexes the prefecture and t indexes the year. YEAR represents a set of year 
dummies and e is the error term. In equation (1), both endogeneity and omitted 
variables bias are possible. To deal with these problems, we use the system GMM 
estimation developed by Blundel and Bond (1998). 
We have observations from 47 prefectures for the seven years 1895, 1900, 1905, 
1910, 1915, 1920, and 1925. SUIT, OVER1M, and OVER3M are taken from the Annual 
Report on Civil Case Statistics.5 WORKER is taken from various issues of the Statistical 
Yearbook of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (Noshomu Tokeihyo) and from 
the Manufacturing Census (Kojo Tokeihyo). For WORKER, because of data limitations, 
we use 1896 data for 1895, and we use 1919 data for 1920. URBAN is taken from the 
Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry of General Affairs (2006). For the urbanization 
variables, we use data from 1898, 1903, 1908, 1913, and 1918 for the years 1895, 1900, 
1905, 1910, and 1915, respectively.  Because the worker data for Okinawa Prefecture in 
1895 are not available, the number of total observations is 328. 
Basic statistics and estimation results are reported in Tables 4 and 5. In each of 
columns (1) to (4), the overidentification restrictions are satisfied (Hansen) and there is 
no second-order serial correlation (AR(2)). When we exclude the interaction term, the 
coefficients of the industrialization and urbanization variables are not significant except 
for URBAN in column (2). When we include the interaction term, its coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant, whereas the coefficients of the (separate) 
industrialization and urbanization variables are not significant (columns (3) and (4)). 
These results imply that industrialization itself did not increase the demand for civil 
suits, but when industrialization accompanied urbanization, there was a significant 
increase in the demand for civil suits. This suggests that, in rural areas, mechanisms 
other than those provided by the legal system worked to resolve disputes associated with 
industrialization. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 
 
Given that simultaneous industrialization and urbanization raised the demand for 
civil suits, one can hypothesize that the appropriate provision of legal services and the 
satisfaction of demand in urban areas would have combined to accelerate 
industrialization. Alternatively, high litigation costs in urban areas would have impeded 
industrialization. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the following growth equation: 
 
GWORKERit = 0 + 1OVER1Mit–1 + 2URBANit–1 + 3OVER1(or 3)Mit–1*URBANit–1 
 + 4INVESTMENTit–1 + 5EDUCATIONt–1 + YEARt + eit,  (2) 
 
where GWORKER is the average annual growth rate in the number of factory workers 
and OVER1M (or OVER3M) represents the litigation cost. The interaction term 
OVER1M*URBAN is used to represent the effect of litigation costs specific to urban 
areas. A negative coefficient of the interaction term supports our hypothesis that the 
negative effect of litigation costs was especially large in urban areas. In addition, we 
include two standard variables for growth regressions, INVESTMENT and 
EDUCATION (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). INVESTMENT is the per capita increase 
                                                            
5 Population, the denominator of SUIT, is taken from the Bureau of Statistics of the 
Ministry of General Affairs (2006). in the paid-in capital of companies, which is obtained from data taken from various 
issues of the Statistical Yearbook of Japan Empire. EDUCATION is the per capita 
number of secondary school students, which is also calculated from data taken from 
various issues of the Statistical Yearbook of Japan Empire. We use system GMM to 
estimate equation (2), taking into account the possible endogeneity of the independent 
variables and the possibility of omitted variables bias. 
Basic statistics and estimation results are reported in Tables 6 and 7. In each of 
columns (1) to (4), the overidentification restrictions are satisfied (Hansen) and there is 
no second-order serial correlation (AR(2)). When we exclude the interaction term, the 
coefficients of the litigation cost variables are not significant (columns (1) and (2)). When 
we include the interaction term, its coefficient is negative and statistically significant in 
column (3). Whereas the coefficient of the interaction term is not statistically significant 
in column (4), its p-value is 0.111. The coefficients of the noninteracted litigation cost 
variables are not significant. These results imply that litigation costs only impeded 
industrialization conditional on urbanization. This finding is consistent with those from 
equation (1). 
 
Tables 6 and 7 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The role of the legal system in the market economy has attracted the interest of 
scholars in various fields of economics, including law and economics, finance, 
development economics, and economic history. One of the focuses in the literature is the 
relationship between the role of the legal system and that of other private mechanisms 
in contract enforcement. In this paper, we addressed this issue using long-term 
prefecture-level panel data that cover the early stages of industrialization and 
urbanization in Japan. 
We found that industrialization increased the demand for civil suits, but only 
conditional on urbanization. That is, the demand for civil suits increased only where 
industrialization and urbanization progressed simultaneously. At the same time, the 
inefficiency of the legal system impeded industrial growth, but this was also conditional 
on urbanization. That is, the inefficiency of the legal system impeded industrialization 
only in urban areas. As we explained in Section 1, there are alternative mechanisms of 
contract enforcement besides the legal system, and these are principally based on 
personal relationships. In this context, our finding that the role of the legal system in 
promoting industrialization was significant only in urban areas is useful. In prewar 
Japan, there were tightly knit communities, especially in rural areas. Our findings 
suggest that community-based contract enforcement mechanisms worked well in rural 
areas until they were superseded by the formal legal system as urbanization progressed 
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Figure 1 Number of civil cases judged at ward courts by issue









































Suits newly accepted (left scale)
Diffusion index (right scale)
％ Figure 2 Civil suits and business cycle
Source: Ministry of Justice, Annual Report on Civil Case Statistics, various issues.Table 1 Basic features of the Japanese court system
1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925
Number of courts Total 1,531 1,814 1,760 1,857 1,839 1,966 2,130
Supreme Court 1111111
High courts 7777777
District courts 49 49 49 50 50 51 51
　Branches  72 79 71 74 64 84 87
Ward courts 301 310 310 312 184 270 281
　Branches  1,101 1,368 1,322 1,413 1,533 1,553 1,703
Number of newly accepted casesTotal 136,087 167,066 164,307 166,436 246,060 177,787 288,909
(civil litigation, first trial) District courts 15,941 28,556 20,332 20,183 23,402 39,885 51,178
Ward courts 120,146 138,510 143,975 146,253 222,658 137,902 237,731
Source: Ministry of Justice, Annual Report on Civil Case Statistics, various issues.
Note: The numbers of District courts and Ward courts include those of their branches.Table 2 Major subcategories of monetary issues judged at ward courts
1895 1910 1925
Issues Number of
cases Issues Number of
cases Issues Number of
cases
Loans without
collaterals 29,919 Loans without
collaterals 33,956 Loans 54,526




3,339 Bills 3,038 Bills 16,993
Deposits 3,335 Sales prices 2,174 Sales prices 5,157
Damages 2,102 Damages 2,131 Reserve funds 4,607
Reserve funds 1,455 Deposits 1,813 House rents 3,928





Reparations 1,123 Others 11,636 Deposits 1,770
House rents 1,069 Maney paid in
stocks 1,762





Total 121,015 Total 66,760 Total 226,677
Notes: Subcategories which included more than 1000 cases.
Source: Ministry of Justice, Annual Report on Civil Case Statistics, 1895, 1910 and 1925 issues.Table 3 Regional distribution of law suits
1895 1905 1915 1925
Number of suits Total 120,146 143,975 222,391 237,025
     newly accepted Hokkaido 3,453 5,574 9,250 13,823
Tohoku 16,690 20,225 22,356 19,759
Kanto 21,981 25,469 33,723 35,668
　　Tokyo 7,715 7,456 14,683 18,997
Chubu 19,871 28,870 34,746 34,142
Kinki 21,894 21,552 45,434 46,940
　　Osaka 8,315 5,687 17,342 19,235
Chugoku 10,236 14,786 29,505 28,688
Shikoku 7,807 7,239 13,585 13,907
Kyushu 18,214 20,260 33,792 44,098
Per 1000 persons Total 2.85 3.01 4.09 3.97
Hokkaido 6.14 5.04 5.13 5.53
Tohoku 3.60 3.88 3.88 3.21
Kanto 2.99 2.84 3.33 2.90
　　Tokyo 4.64 3.06 5.13 4.24
Chubu 2.17 2.96 3.19 3.02
Kinki 3.30 2.85 5.15 4.67
　　Osaka 6.17 3.22 7.63 6.29
Chugoku 2.28 3.08 5.64 5.58
Shikoku 2.70 2.38 4.08 4.38
Kyushu 2.80 2.73 3.99 4.86
Source: Ministry of Justuce,  Annual Report on Civil Case Statistics, various issues; Bureau of Statistics
     of the Cabinet(1907); Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry of General Affairs (2006).Table 4 Basic statistics of the valiables for litigation demand regression
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SUIT 328 3.156 1.261 0.581 7.866
WORKER 328 0.014 0.013 0.000 0.079
URBAN 328 0.091 0.154 0.000 0.815
WORKER*URBA 328 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.052
OVER１M 328 0.219 0.129 0.017 0.750
OVER3M 328 0.075 0.058 0.001 0.319Table 5 Determinants of litigation demand
Dependent variable: SUIT (1) (2) (3) (4)
WORKER 14.135 ( 1.19) 7.408 (0.69) 2.85 (0.27) -0.51 (-0.05)
URBAN 1.000 (0.98) 1.681 ( 1.90) * -0.203 ( -0.20) -0.553 (-0.05)
WORKER*URBAN ( 0.68) 47.784 ( 2.44) ** 49.661 ( 2.41) **
OVER1M 0.979 (1.41) 0.786 (0.61)
OVER3M -2.065 (-1.08) -2.154 (-1.25)
1900 0.333 (2.55) ** 0.320 (2.41) ** 0.292 (2.16) ** 0.283 (2.01) **
1905 0.256 (1.08) 0.075 ( 0.31) 0.246 ( 1.01) 0.116 ( 0.48)
1910 -0.359 (-0.17) -0.190 (-0.82) -0.298 (-0.14) -0.153 (-0.69)
1915 0.903 ( 4.58) *** 0.903 ( 4.18) *** 0.906 ( 4.51) *** 0.918 ( 4.10) ***
1920 -0.842 (-3.68) *** -0.618 (-3.02) -0.81 (-3.82) *** -0.632 (-3.31) ***
1925 0.455 ( 1.30) 0.764 ( 2.86) *** 0.547 ( 1.66) 0.816 ( 3.20) ***
Cons. 2.5 (9.25) *** 2.876 (12.81) *** 2.691 (8.90) *** 3.027 (11.89) ***
Obs. 328 328 328 328
Hansen 0.505 0.427 0.513 0.378
AR(2)  0.618 0.480 0.584 0.438
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust t-values are in parentheses. P-values are
        reported for Hansen test of overidentification and Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in
        first differences.
        *** statistically significant at 1% level.
        **   statistically significant at 5% level.Table 6 Basic statistics of the valiables for growth regression
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GWORKER 280 0.046 0.089 -0.427 0.305
OVER1M-1 280 0.188 0.099 0.017 0.457
OVER3M-1 280 0.064 0.049 0.001 0.276
URBAN-1 280 0.085 0.155 0.000 0.815
OVER1M-1*URBAN-1 280 0.015 0.034 0.000 0.288
OVER3M-1*URBAN-1 280 0.005 0.013 0.000 0.094
INVESTMENT-1 280 0.012 0.078 -0.011 1.175
EDUCATION-1 280 0.009 0.013 0.000 0.122Table 7 Legal efficiency and industrial growth
Dependent variable: GWORKER (1) (2) (3) (4)
OVER1M-1 0.110 ( 0.80) 0.206 ( 1.59)
OVER3M-1 0.095 ( 0.52) 0.156 (  0.84)
URBAN-1 0.346 ( 1.56) 0.115 (0.442) 0.161 ( 1.99) * 0.169 ( 1.71) *
OVER1M-1*URBAN-1 -0.704 (-1.90) *
OVER3M-1*URBAN-1 -0.169 (-1.62)
INVESTMENT-1 0.050 ( 1.25) 0.048 ( 1.75) * 0.045 ( 1.48) 0.044 (  1.65)
EDUCATION-1 0.402 (0.63) 0.249 ( 0.44) 0.508 ( 0.95) 0.271 (0.48)
1905 0.055 ( 3.00) *** 0.057 ( 2.96) ** 0.058 ( 3.28) *** 0.067 ( 3.27) ***
1910 0.027 (1.30) 0.024 (1.26) 0.041 ( 2.05) ** 0.028 ( 1.43)
1915 -0.115 (-0.52) -0.007 (-0.32) 0.008 ( 0.36) 0 (-0.01)
1920 0.105 ( 5.67) *** 0.121 ( 6.51) *** 0.128 ( 6.95) *** 0.13 (  6.90) ***
1925 -0.032 (-1.41) -0.015 (-0.72) -0.016 (-0.71) -0.007 (-0.34)
Cons. -0.319 (-1.01) -0.002 (-0.11) -0.037 (-1.27) -0.007 (-0.37)
Obs. 280 280 280 280
Hansen 0.192 0.133 0.454 0.342
AR(2)  0.333 0.365 0.321 0.312
Note: Heteroskedasticity robust t-values are in parentheses. P-values are
        reported for Hansen test of overidentification and Arellano-Bond test of AR(2) in
        first differences.
        *** statistically significant at 1% level.
        **   statistically significant at 5% level.